Talks

There are a number of arguments in the philosophical, physical and cosmological literatures for the thesis that time is not fundamental to the description of nature. According to this view, time should be only an approximate notion which emerges from a more fundamental, timeless description only in certain limiting approximations. My first task is to review these arguments and explain why they fail. I will then examine the opposite view, which is that time and change are fundamental and, indeed, are perhaps the only aspects of reality that are not emergent from a more fundamental, microscopic description. The argument involves several aspects of contemporary physics and cosmology including 1) the problem of the landscape of string theory, 2) cosmological inflation and the problem of initial conditions, 3) the interpretation of the “wavefunction of the universe,” and the problem of what is an observable in classical and quantum general relativity. It also involves issues in the foundations of mathematics and the issue of the proper understanding of the role of mathematics in physics. The view that time is real and not emergent is, I will argue, supported by considerations arising from all these issues It leads finally to a need for a notion of law in cosmology which replaces the freedom to choose initial conditions with a notion of laws evolving in time. The arguments presented here have been developed in collaboration with Roberto Mangabeira Unger .

This course is aimed at advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students, and is inspired by a book by the same title, written by Padmanabhan. Each session consists of solving one or two pre-determined problems, which is done by a randomly picked student. While the problems introduce various subjects in Astrophysics and Cosmology, they do not serve as replacement for standard courses in these subjects, and are rather aimed at educating students with hands-on analytic/numerical skills to attack new problems.

I discuss how we can give a satisfactory account of theory confirmation for theories with random data, such as Copenhagen quantum theory, despite the lack of a completely satisfactory definition of probabilistic theories of nature. I also explain why neither this nor any other proposed account of scientific confirmation works for many-worlds theories

I will identify six \'problems of time\' that arise in connection with quantum gravity and review the extent to which some of them can be regarded as solved, highlighting the very different aspects that they assume depending on one\'s starting point: Hamiltonian vs. path-integral, discrete vs continuous.

There is now a great deal of evidence confirming the existence of a very hot and dense early stage of the universe. Much of this data comes from a detailed study of the cosmic microwave background (CMB) - radiation from the early universe that was most recently measured by NASA\'s WMAP satellite. But the information presents new puzzles for scientists. One of the most blatant examples is an apparent paradox related to the second law of thermodynamics. Although some have argued that the hypothesis of inflationary cosmology solves some of the puzzles, profound issues remain. In this talk, Professor Penrose will describe a very different proposal, one that suggests a succession of universes prior to our own. He will also present a recent analysis of the CMB data that has a profound bearing on these issues.

Exactly half a century after Minkowski’s justly famous lecture, Dirac’s efforts to quantize gravity led him “to doubt how fundamental the four-dimensional requirement in physics is”. Dirac does not appear to have explored this doubt further, but I shall argue that it needs to be considered seriously. The fact is that Einstein and Minkowski fused space and time into a four-dimensional continuum but never directly posed the two most fundamental questions in dynamics: What is time? What is motion? It was an historical accident that Einstein attempted to implement Mach’s principle after he had created special relativity; otherwise he would have been forced to address these questions, which have never been properly considered. I shall show how they can be answered and suggest that: 1) time and space are utterly different; 2) the dynamical law of the universe may define absolute simultaneity in a manner that is still consistent with local validity of Minkowski’s marvellous notion of spacetime.

The evidence for the big bang is now overwhelming. However, the basic question of what caused the bang remains open. One possibility is that time somehow \'emerged,\' placing the universe in an inflationary state. Another, perhaps more conservative possibility, is that the big bang was a violent event in a pre-existing universe. I will describe model calculations employing the AdS/CFT correspondence which show how this is possible, and which point to a new explanation for the origin of large scale structure in the universe.

In recent work with Bob Coecke and others, we have developed a categorical axiomatization of quantum mechanics. This analyzes the main structural features of quantum mechanics into simple and general elements, which admit an elegant diagrammatic representation. This enables an illuminating and effective analysis of quantum information protocols and computational structures. One aspect which is brought to light in this analysis is that protocols such as teleportation use entanglement to achieve a logical information flow which has an apparent retro-causal (or even `backward-in-time\') component. However, there is also a physical or operational description of the same systems, based on an abstract structural characterization of quantum measurements, which is entirely causally consistent. The systematic relationship between these two descriptions suggests a novel perspective on the flow of time and information in the quantum realm.

In recent years there has been a growing awareness that studies on quantum foundations have close relationships with other fields such as probability and information theory. In this talk I give another example of how such interdisciplinary work can be fruitful, by applying some of the lessons from quantum mechanics, in particular from Bell\'s theorem, to a debate on the philosophical foundations of decision theory. I argue that the basic assumptions of the popular causal decision theory -- which was developed partly in response to a puzzle proposed by the physicist William Newcomb and published by the philosopher Robert Nozick -- are analogous to the basic assumptions of a local hidden-variables theory in the context of Bell\'s theorem. Both have too strong a prejudice about the causal structure of the world: there are possible games the world can pose such that an agent who operates by those theories is constrained to choose losing strategies no matter what evidence he or she acquires.