Quantum Physics

Non-relativistic quantum mechanics is derived as an example of entropic inference. The basic assumption is that the position of a particle is subject to an irreducible uncertainty of unspecified origin. The corresponding probability distributions constitute a curved statistical manifold. The probability for infinitesimally small changes is obtained from the method of maximum entropy and the concept of time is introduced as a book-keeping device to keep track of how they accumulate. This requires introducing appropriate notions of instant and of duration. A welcome feature is that this entropic notion of time incorporates a natural distinction between past and future. The Schroedinger equation is recovered when the statistical manifold participates in the dynamics in such a way that there is a conserved energy: its curved geometry guides the motion of the particles while they, in their turn, react back and determine its evolving geometry. The phase of the wave function—not just its magnitude—is explained as a feature of purely statistical origin. Finally, the model is extended to include external electromagnetic fields and gauge transformations.

The arrow of time dilemma: the laws of physics are invariant for time inversion, whereas the familiar phenomena we see everyday are not (i.e. entropy increases). I show that, within a quantum mechanical framework, all phenomena which leave a trail of information behind (and hence can be studied by physics) are those where entropy necessarily increases or remains constant. All phenomena where the entropy decreases must not leave any information of their having happened. This situation is completely indistinguishable from their not having happened at all. In the light of this observation, the second law of thermodynamics is reduced to a mere tautology: physics cannot study those processes where entropy has decreased, even if they were commonplace. I will discuss the possible limitations that stem from recent typicality results in employing this as a complete self-consistent solution to the arrow of time dilemma.

Many putative explanations in physics rely on idealized models of physical systems. These explanations are inconsistent with standard philosophical accounts of explanation. A common view holds that idealizations can underwrite explanation nonetheless, but only when they are what have variously been called Galilean, approximative, traditional or controllable. Controllability is the least vague of these categories, and this paper focuses on the relation between controllability and explanation. Specifically, it argues that the common view is an untenable half-measure. It gives the example of a simple pendulum with quadratic damping, an uncontrollable idealization that makes use of singular limits and for which the behaviour at the limit is qualitatively new—but a system whose behaviour is fully explained in terms of the idealization. It shows that uncontrollable idealizations can have explanatory capacities (and in a way distinct from Batterman’s “asymptotic explanation”).

Shared entanglement between sender and receiver can enable more errors to be corrected than with a standard quantum error-correcting code. This extra error correction can be used either to boost the rate of the code--commonly seen in quantum codes constructed from classical linear codes--or to increase the error-correcting power of the code (as represented by, for example, the code distance). We will see how adding extra entanglement to a given quantum code can increase its distance, and discuss the optimization problem in maximizing the effectiveness of a given amount of added entanglement. We will also briefly examine some applications of entanglement-assistance to particular types of codes, such as LDPC codes and convolutional codes.

One might have hoped that philosophers had sorted out what ‘truth’ is supposed to be by now. After all, Aristotle offered what seems to be a clear and simple characterization in his Metaphysics. So perhaps it is surprising (and then again perhaps it isn’t), that contemporary philosophers have not settled on a consensus regarding the nature of truth to this day. In fact, the most obvious theory of truth, that truth consists in correspondence to the facts, seems to be steadily waning in popularity in technical circles, replaced instead by a perhaps puzzlingly austere minimalist theory that restricts its characterization of truth to the familiar equivalence schema:

is true if and only if p. The differences between such deflationary theories and the ‘traditional’ correspondence theory of truth, and perhaps even more strikingly between these theories and epistemic theories of truth, call to mind counterpart features in different attitudes about the proper interpretation of quantum mechanics. By reviewing the most striking features of different theories of truth, as well as some of their most difficult objections, we can start to see where different interpretations seem to be reliant on (or at least quite congenial to) particular theories of truth and also where these theories begin to reveal themselves as variously helping and hindering the smooth functioning of different interpretations.

Our starting point is a particular `canvas' aimed to `draw' theories of physics, which has symmetric monoidal categories as its mathematical backbone. With very little structural effort (i.e. in very abstract terms) and in a very short time this categorical quantum mechanics research program has reproduced a surprisingly large fragment of quantum theory. Philosophically speaking, this framework shifts the conceptual focus from `material carriers' such as particles, fields, or other `material stuff', to `logical flows of information', by mainly encoding how things stand in relation to each other. These relations could, for example, be induced by operations. Composition of these relations is the carrier of all structure. Thus far the causal structure has been treated somewhat informally within this approach. In joint work with my student Raymond Lal, by restricting the capabilities to compose, we were able to formally encode causal connections. We call the resulting mathematical structure a CauCat, since it combines the symmetric monoidal stricture with Sorkin's CauSets within a single mathematical concept. The relations which now respect causal structure are referred to as processes, which make up the actual `happenings'. As a proof of concept, we show that if in a quantum teleportation protocol one omits classical communication, no information is transfered. We also characterize Galilean theories. Classicality is an attribute of certain processes, and measurements are special kinds of processes, defined in terms of their capabilities to correlate other processes to these classical attributes. So rather than quantization, what we do is classicization within our universe of processes. We show how classicality and the causal structure are tightly intertwined. All of this is still very much work in progress!

Topological phases in spin systems are exciting frontiers of research with intimate connections to quantum coding theory. However, there is a disconnection between quantum codes and the idea of topology, in the absence of geometry and physical realizability. Here, we introduce a toy model, in which quantum codes are constrained to not only have a local geometric description, but also have translation and scale symmetries. These additional physical constraints enable us to assign topologically invariant properties to geometric shapes of logical operators of the code. Topological phases of the model are analyzed by geometrically classifying logical operators. The classification scheme also has topologically universal properties which are invariant under local unitary transformations and local perturbations, and may explain how global symmetries of a system Hamiltonian give rise to topological phases in correlated spin systems.

The Wheeler delayed choice experiment, Elitzur-Vaidman interaction-free measurement, and Hosten-Kwiat counterfactual computation will be discussed to answer Bohr's forbidden question: "Where is a quantum particle while it is inside a Mach-Zehnder Interferometer?". I will argue that the naive application of Wheeler's approach fails to explain a weak trace left by the particle and that the two-state vector description is required.

Quantum Bayesianism is a point of view on quantum foundations that says that there is no such thing as a “measurement problem” because there is no such THING as a quantum state: Quantum states are not things---instead information. But the view doesn’t stop there; it starts there! Taking the idea seriously over the last 15 years has been the direct motivation for a number of theorems and objects in quantum information theory: from the no-broadcasting theorem, to the quantum de Finetti theorem, and even some quantum cryptographic alphabets. I will review some of this, and then move on to the holy grail of present efforts: Finding an efficient representation of quantum states in terms of a singular probability function. Doing so leads to the hard technical problem of demonstrating the existence of a certain very symmetric sets of quantum states, and holds out the hope of understanding the amount of “quantum stuff” in a physical system in terms of a single parameter. (I.e., there is the THING that the quantum state is not).

In the Scholium in Newton's Principia which contains the discussions about absolute space, time, and the bucket experiment, Newton also posed a problem that Julian Barbour has denoted the "Scholium problem". Newton writes there "But how are we to obtain the true motions from their causes, effects, and apparent differences, and the converse, shall be explained more at large in the following treatise. For to this end it was that I composed it". This problem was clearly considered very important by Newton who claims he wrote the Principia dedicated to this problem. Interestingly Newton never returned to the problem. In this talk we are going to give a mathematical precise formulation of the Scholium problem. A subpart of the Scholium problem consists of determining how accurate the observers clock is. We are going to start from that end and see that the problem of defining duration is inseparately intertwined with the full scholium problem.

Does quantum mechanics really tell us that particles, molecules, and maybe even cats, can be in two places at once? Does it force us to deny a reality that is independent of our observation? How can scientists disagree about what quantum mechanics means and yet still agree that it is right? Joseph Emerson, co-writer of the award-winning documentary “The Quantum Tamers”, will address these questions and then describe, drawing on preview clips from the documentary, how the weirdness of the quantum world is now being harnessed for a ‘quantum information revolution’ that includes quantum teleportation, super-secure quantum communication, and the exponential power of quantum computation.

In this talk, I will demonstrate that correlations inconsistent with any locally causal description can be a generic feature of measurements on entangled quantum states. Specifically, spatially-separated parties who perform local measurements on a maximally-entangled state using randomly chosen measurement bases can, with significant probability, generate nonclassical correlations that violate a Bell inequality. For n parties using a Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger state, this probability of violation rapidly tends to unity as the number of parties increases. Moreover, even with both a randomly chosen two-qubit pure state and randomly chosen measurement bases, a violation can be found about 10% of the time. Amongst other applications, our work provides a feasible alternative for the demonstration of Bell inequality violation without a shared reference frame.