Quantum Physics

One hundred years after Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, the question of how to make simultaneous measurements of noncommuting observables lingers. I will survey one hundred years of measurement theory, which brings us to the point where we can formulate how to measure any set observables weakly and simultaneously and then concatenate such measurements continuously to determine what is a strong measurement of the same observables. The description of the measurements is independent of quantum states---this we call instrument autonomy---and even independent of Hilbert space---this we call the universal Instrument Manifold Program. But what space, if not Hilbert space? It’s a whole new world: the Kraus operators of an instrument live in a Lie-group manifold generated by the measured observables themselves. I will describe measuring position and momentum and measuring the three components of angular momentum, special cases where the instrument approaches asymptotically a phase-space boundary of the instrumental Lie-group manifold populated by coherent states; these special universal instruments structure any Hilbert space in which they are represented. In contrast, for almost all sets of observables other than these special cases, the universal instrument descends into chaos ... literally. This work was done with Christopher S. Jackson, whose genius and vision inform every aspect.

---

Zoom link https://pitp.zoom.us/j/94135518267?pwd=T2JOL21VaEcrY05KeG1SYTVYdHhxdz09

Quantum position verification (QPV) was first introduced, under the name quantum tagging, in a patent filed in 2004. It was first discussed in the academic literature in 2009-10. The schemes proposed to that point were shown to be breakable by teleportation attacks in 2010, and a general no-go theorem showing all schemes in this class are breakable was subsequently proved. However, in an alternative standard cryptographic security scenario, in which the tag is assumed to be able to keep classical data secret, unconditionally secure schemes were presented in 2010. The various terminologies and security scenarios highlight important points whose theoretical and practical implications still remain underexplored. In practice, one normally wants to verify the location of a person or valuable object, not of an easily replaceable tagging device, for at least two reasons: (i) the device itself is not so valuable, (ii) adversaries can easily construct a replacement device and thereby potentially spoof the scheme. This requires physical assumptions about the integrity of the tag and its attachment, and bounds on the speed with which the tag may be displaced or destroyed and replaced. QPV schemes that do not rely on such assumptions are breakable without teleportation or non-local computation attacks. In the other direction, when such significant physical assumptions are necessary, it may generally be reasonable to include tag security among them. In this overview I review the early history of QPV and describe various security scenarios and their potential applications. I give versions of the secure 2010 scheme designed for efficient practical implementation and discuss the frequency, accuracy and security of position verification attainable for these schemes with present technology. I also discuss the implied constraints on what may be attainable for QPV schemes involving real-time quantum measurement and/or quantum information processing.