ICTS:31029

Video URL

The Best Experienced Payoff Dynamic in the Ultimatum Minigame

The Best Experienced Payoff Dynamic in the Ultimatum Minigame

(2025). The Best Experienced Payoff Dynamic in the Ultimatum Minigame. SciVideos. https://youtu.be/ohG79kVfz-s

The Best Experienced Payoff Dynamic in the Ultimatum Minigame. SciVideos, Mar. 11, 2025, https://youtu.be/ohG79kVfz-s 

          @misc{ scivideos_ICTS:31029,
            doi = {},
            url = {https://youtu.be/ohG79kVfz-s},
            author = {},
            keywords = {},
            language = {en},
            title = {The Best Experienced Payoff Dynamic in the Ultimatum Minigame},
            publisher = {},
            year = {2025},
            month = {mar},
            note = {ICTS:31029 see, \url{https://scivideos.org/index.php/icts-tifr/31029}}
          }
Ratul Lahkar
Talk numberICTS:31029
Source RepositoryICTS-TIFR
Collection

Abstract

In the ultimatum minigame, proposers can offer either half the total prize or just $1$. Responders can accept or reject. At the subgame perfect equilibrium, proposers offer $1$ and responders accept. We apply the best experienced payoff (BEP) dynamic to the large population version of this game. The BEP dynamic is generated when players try their strategies a certain number of times and choose the strategy that generates the highest average payoff. We establish conditions under which the subgame perfect equilibrium is stable or unstable. If it is unstable, another stable state can arise where a significant fraction of proposers make high offers.