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All known hidden variable theories that completely reproduce all quantum predictions share the feature that they add some information to the quantum state "psi". That is, if one knew the "state of reality" given by the hidden variable(s) "lambda", then one could infer the quantum state - the hidden variables are additional to the quantum state. However, for the case of a single 2-dimensional quantum system Kochen and Specker gave a model which does not have this feature – the non-orthogonality of two quantum states is manifested as overlapping probability distributions on the hidden variables, and teh model could be termed “psi-epistemic”. A natural question arises whether a similar model is possible for higher dimensional systems. At the time of writing this abstract I have no clue. I will talk about various constraints on such theories (in particular on how they manifest contextuality) and I'll present some examples of failed attempts to construct such models for a 3-dimensional system. I will also discuss a very artificial tweaking of Bell’s original hidden variable model which renders it psi-epistemic for some (though not all) of the corresponding quantum states.

The subject of this conference is the Quantum State --- what the hell it is. A central issue is whether quantum states describe reality (the ontic view) or an agent's knowledge of reality (the epistemic view). Advocates of the epistemic view maintain that many quantum puzzles and conundra are artifacts of an inappropriate reification of strictly epistemic concepts. To provide a broader context for such considerations, I argue that even in classical physics we have got into major trouble by inappropriately conferring physical reality on the abstractions we have used to organize what we know.

Instrumentalism about the quantum state is the view that this mathematical object does not serve to represent a component of (non-directly observable) reality, but is rather a device solely for making predictions about the results of experiments. One honest way to be such an instrumentalist is a) to take an ensemble view (= frequentism about quantum probabilities), whereby the state represents predictions for measurement results on ensembles of systems, but not individual systems and b) to assign some specific level for the quantum/classical cut. But what happens if one drops (b), or (a), or both, as some have been inclined to? Can one achieve a consistent view then? A major worry is illustrated by the Wigner's friend scenario: it looks as if it should make a measurable difference where one puts the cut, so how can it be consistent to slide it around (as, e.g., Bohr was wont to)? I'll discuss two main cases: that of Asher Peres' book, which adopts (a) but drops (b); and that of the quantum Bayesians Caves, Fuchs and Shack, which drops both. A view of Peres' sort can I, think, be made consistent, though may look a little strained; the quantum Bayesians' can too, though there are some subtleties (which I shall discuss) about how one should handle Wigner's friend.