PIRSA:24040083

Video URL

https://pirsa.org/24040083

Higher-Order Blind Quantum Computation

Vinet, T. (2024). Higher-Order Blind Quantum Computation. Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics. https://pirsa.org/24040083

Vinet, Thomas. Higher-Order Blind Quantum Computation. Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics, Apr. 11, 2024, https://pirsa.org/24040083 

          @misc{ scivideos_PIRSA:24040083,
            doi = {10.48660/24040083},
            url = {https://pirsa.org/24040083},
            author = {Vinet, Thomas},
            keywords = {Quantum Foundations},
            language = {en},
            title = {Higher-Order Blind Quantum Computation},
            publisher = {Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics},
            year = {2024},
            month = {apr},
            note = {PIRSA:24040083 see, \url{https://scivideos.org/pirsa/24040083}}
          }

Thomas Vinet Télécom Paris

Talk numberPIRSA:24040083
DOI10.48660/24040083
Source RepositoryPIRSA
Collection
Talk Type Scientific Series
Subject

Abstract

In the near future, where only a small number of companies and institutions will have access to large-scale quantum computers, it is essential that clients are able to delegate their computations in a secure way, without their data being accessible by the server. The field of blind quantum computation has emerged in recent years to address this issue, however, the majority of work on this topic has so far been restricted to the secure computation of sequences of quantum gates acting on a quantum state. Yet, a client capable of performing quantum subroutines may want to conceal not only their quantum states but also the subroutines they perform themselves. In this work, we introduce a framework of higher-order blind quantum computation, where a client performs a quantum subroutine (for example a unitary gate), which is transformed in a functional way by a server with more powerful quantum capabilities (described by a higher-order transformation), without the server learning about the details of the subroutine performed. As an example, we show how the DQC1 algorithm for estimating the trace of a unitary gate can be implemented securely by a server given only an (extended) black-box description of the unitary gate. Finally, we extend the framework to the case where the details of the server's algorithm are also concealed from the client.

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