Device-independent quantum key distribution

          @misc{ scivideos_PIRSA:10100055,
            doi = {10.48660/10100055},
            url = {https://pirsa.org/10100055},
            author = {Hanggi, Esther},
            keywords = {Quantum Information},
            language = {en},
            title = {Device-independent quantum key distribution},
            publisher = {Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics},
            year = {2010},
            month = {oct},
            note = {PIRSA:10100055 see, \url{https://scivideos.org/pirsa/10100055}}
          }
          

Abstract

Even though the security of quantum key distribution has been rigorously proven, most practical schemes can be attacked and broken. These attacks make use of imperfections of the physical devices used for their implementation. Since current security proofs assume that the physical devices' exact and complete specification is known, they do not hold for this scenario. The goal of device-independent quantum key distribution is to show security without making any assumptions about the internal working of the devices. In this talk, I will first explain the assumptions 'traditional' security proofs make and why they are problematic. Then, I will discuss how the violation of Bell inequalities can be used to show security even when a large part of the physical devices is untrusted.