Learning and Incentives (Part II)

          @misc{ scivideos_19267,
            doi = {},
            url = {https://simons.berkeley.edu/talks/learning-and-incentives-part-ii},
            author = {},
            keywords = {},
            language = {en},
            title = {Learning and Incentives (Part II)},
            publisher = {The Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing},
            year = {2022},
            month = {jan},
            note = {19267 see, \url{https://scivideos.org/Simons-Institute/19267}}
          }
          

Abstract

Classically, the outcome of a learning algorithm is considered in isolation from the effects that it may have on the process that generates the data or the party who is interested in learning. In today's world, increasingly more people and organizations interact with learning systems, making it necessary to consider these effects. This tutorial will cover the mathematical foundation for addressing learning and learnability in the presence of economic and social forces. We will cover recent advances in the theory of machine learning and algorithmic economics. In the first half of this tutorial, we will consider strategic and adversarial interactions between learning algorithms and those affected by algorithmic actions. What makes these interactions especially powerful is that they often occur over a long-term basis and can corrupt data patterns that are essential for machine learning. In this part of the talk, we work with online decision processes (such as no-regret learning) and solution concepts (such as stackelberg and minmax equilibria) to discuss statistical and computational aspects of  learning and learnability in the presence of such interactions. In the second half of the tutorial, we will consider collaborative interactions in machine learning. What makes these interactions especially beneficial is their ability to learn across multiple stakeholders' tasks. In this part of the talk, we see how online algorithms act as a medium for effective collaborations. We also discuss challenges involved in designing efficient data sharing mechanisms that fully account for learner's incentives.